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Abstract—High-quality custom-made 3D masks are increasing
becoming a serious threat to face-recognition systems. This threat
is driven, in part, by the falling cost of manufacturing such
masks. Research in face presentation-attack detection (PAD) in
general, and also specifically for 3D-mask based attacks, has
mostly concentrated on imagery in the visible-light range of
wavelengths (RGB). We look beyond imagery in the visible-light
spectrum to find potentially easier solutions for the challenge
of face presentation-attack detection (PAD). In particular, we
explore the use of near-infrared (NIR) and thermal imagery
to detect print-, replay-, and 3D-mask-attacks. This preliminary
study shows that both NIR and thermal imagery can potentially
simplify the task of face-PAD.
Keywords—Face Presentation Attack Detection, 3D-Masks, RG-
B/depth cameras, thermal cameras, NIR, LWIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Typical face-recognition (FR) methods are highly sus-
ceptible to presentation attacks (PA), also commonly called
spoof attacks [5], [11]. The term ’presentation attacks’ covers
both impersonation as well as concealment attacks [6]. Most
research efforts on presentation attack detection (PAD) so far,
have considered specific kinds of attacks, and have proposed
solutions to such attacks under specific conditions. Mainly
2D impersonation attacks, that is, attacks performed using 2D
presentation-attack instruments (PAI) such as printed paper
(print attacks) and replay on digital screens (replay-attacks)
have been studied. The proposed solutions have usually con-
sidered the scenario where the biometric sensor is a single
color-camera. These solutions are very well-suited for certain
applications, such as for current mobile devices. The sensors
on such devices are standard color cameras. Therefore, the
same sensor-data is typically used for both, face-recognition,
as well as for face-PAD. The PAD solutions so far have
mainly relied on features extracted from color images and
sophisticated machine learning algorithms, to delineate that
ever-shrinking margin between the two classes (bona fide
and attack presentations). One reason why PAD research has
evolved in this direction is that adding extra sensors has often
been infeasible, due to cost and space constraints.
(a) Custom-made rigid masks
(b) Generic silicone mask
(c) Custom-made silicone mask
Fig. 1: Examples of realistic 3D masks. Approximate prices: (a)
US$300, (b) US$800, and (c) US$4000.
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PAs using custom-made 3D masks are receiving increasing
attention [5], [9]. Figure 1 shows examples of 3D-masks,
including rigid masks and soft silicone masks. Highly realistic
3D-masks, such as the custom-made silicone mask shown
in Fig. 1(c), are still quite expensive. However, the process
of manufacturing custom-made silicone masks is evolving
rapidly, and such masks will be available at accessible prices in
the near future. The study presented in this paper is motivated
by the threat that attacks on FR systems using high-fidelity
custom masks may soon become as commonplace as print-
attacks and replay-attacks today.
A new category of consumer-grade imaging devices, col-
lectively referred to as extended-range imaging devices, are
now available that capture data not only in visible-light wave-
lengths (i.e., color images), but also in near-infrared (NIR)
and long-wave infrared (LWIR) domains. Color/depth (RGB-
D) cameras, for example, the Microsoft Kinect and Intel
RealSense series of products, and thermal cameras can provide
easy solutions for once challenging PAD problems.
In this article, we explore the use of such devices to
simplify the task of face-PAD for both 2D and 3D attacks.
This hardware based approach is especially well-suited for
near-real-time scenarios such as border-control applications.
The data and code used for the experiments presented in this
paper are made freely available on the web3.
Following a summary of related research (Section II) on
the use of extended-range imaging in face biometrics, as well
as on PAD for 3D-mask attacks, we provide, in Section III,
brief descriptions of the imaging devices that have been used
in this work. Experimental results are presented and discussed
in Section IV. Finally, Section V gives a summary of this work,
along with an outlook on how this work will evolve in future.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous efforts with specialized imaging-sensors for face
biometrics applications have been concentrated mainly on the
problem of face-recognition. Bhowmick et al. [3] have shown
that thermal imagery can be used for face-recognition based
on facial vein-patterns. Bebis et al. [2] explore the fusion of
visible and thermal imagery for face-recognition applications.
Although they use face-recognition performance as a metric,
the main focus of their work is on evaluating different methods
for fusing the data from the two modalities.
Lagorio et al. [8] use 3D scans from a Vectra 3D cam-
era in a PAD scenario, to detect curved-paper based print
presentation-attacks. More recently Raghavendra et al. [13]
have published a detailed study on the vulnerability of FR
systems in extended multispectral imaging domain, involv-
ing seven-band imagery covering the visible light and NIR
illumination. Their work shows that all the four studied FR
approaches are consistently vulnerable in all imaging-bands
considered, except for the 930nm (NIR) band. This finding
is consistent with previous research [7] showing that the
reflectance of human skin drops significantly in a narrow
wavelength band centered at 970nm. Steiner et al. [14] have
demonstrated the use of multispectral SWIR imagery to reli-
ably distinguish human skin from other materials, and have
shown that such multispectral devices can be used for PAD.
3https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.BioSig2017 3DMaskPreStudy
(a) RealSense SR300
(b) Xenics Gobi-640
Fig. 2: Cameras used in this work.
Good quality 3D masks present clear threats in both
impersonation as well as concealment categories. Erdogmus
et al. [5] have published the 3DMAD dataset, using a set of
custom-made rigid masks, for experiments in 3D face-PAD.
This dataset has also been used by other research groups [1] in
other 2D face-PAD experiments. Liu et al. [9] have published
the more recent HKBU-MARs dataset containing images of
3D-mask based PAs. They have proposed a remote photo-
plethysmography (rPPG) based approach to detecting 3D-mask
PAs. Both works ([5], [9]) use several variants of local binary
patterns (LBP) to demonstrate the vulnerability of FR methods
to the 3D-mask PAs.
Manjani et al. [10] present an observational study into
concealment attacks using 3D-masks. They describe PAD
experiments based on the SMAD dataset [10], which con-
sists of public-domain videos collected from the World-wide
Web.The dataset, however, is relatively small – including only
65 genuine videos and 65 silicon-mask videos. Although obser-
vational studies such as this may indicate association between
variables (in this case between the true labels of the test videos
and the classifier-score), the influence of other confounding
variables here cannot be ruled out. To demonstrate the efficacy
of a method for detecting 3D-mask based PAs, it is important
to design a controlled experiment to highlight exclusively the
causal effect of 3D-masks on the resulting classifier-score.
III. EXTENDED-RANGE IMAGERY
In this work we have explored the use of two different
cameras – the RealSense SR300 camera from Intel, and the
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Gobi-640-GigE LWIR camera produced by Xenics4 – for PAD
applications.
The RealSense SR300 camera (Fig. 2(a)) is Intel’s second
generation depth-sensing camera. It uses a structured-light
approach, based on 860nm NIR illumination, to capture depth
information from a 3D surface. This camera has a relatively
shallow field of view, and produces the most accurate results
in the depth range of 0.2m – 1.2m. In practice, the implication
for PAD applications is that the average intensity of the NIR
image drops rapidly with distance. Therefore, to capture good
quality images, the subject should be positioned quite close
(0.3m – 0.5m) to the camera. Besides depth-information, the
camera also captures color (RGB) images and NIR images.
It is important to note that the two cameras (color and NIR)
have different fields of view, and are not mutually calibrated.
For the experiments discussed in this paper, we have used both
color and NIR images at VGA resolution.
The Xenics Gobi thermal camera, shown in Fig. 2(b),
covers a wavelength range of 800nm – 1200nm, and captures
16-bit images at VGA (640×480 pixels) resolution. Although
the camera can take a range of lenses, we have used the
standard 18mm f/1 lens, with a horizontal field of view of
33◦.
For both cameras, we have developed data-capture tools in-
house, based on software development kits (SDK) are available
for each camera. When using images outside the visible-light
range of wavelengths, one practical problem that arises is that
of face-detection. Most face-detection tools take a machine-
learning based approach, and need to be trained with sufficient
amounts of training-data. Since faces present different spec-
tral characteristics in different wavelengths, these appearance-
based face-detection schemes need to be explicitly trained for
each imaging modality. We simplify the face-detection process,
for each camera, by positioning the subject such that the face
falls within a pre-defined rectangle (displayed on the live-
display monitor). The position and size of the rectangle can
be adjusted for each subject, and is recorded along with the
images. Thus, for each camera, face-position information is
available directly from the data-capture process.
Sample images of bona fide presentations are shown in Fig.
3. The images in Fig. 3(a) and (b) have been captured using the
SR300 RGB-D camera, and show the bona fide presentation in
visible wavelengths (RGB) and NIR band respectively. Figure
3(c) shows an image captured using the Xenics Gobi thermal
camera, illustrating the appearance of a bona fide presentation
in the LWIR band.
4Website: www.xenics.com
(a) Visible (RGB)
(b) NIR
(c) Thermal (LWIR)
Fig. 3: Examples of bona fide presentation images, as seen in
different wavelength bands. Images in (a) visible (RGB) and (b) NIR
wavelength-bands have been captured using the SR300. The LWIR
band image (c) has been captured using the Xenics Gobi camera.
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IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present experimental results for PAD
based on extended-range imagery. Based on some initial tests,
we concluded that NIR images have the potential to easily
detect 2D and 3D PAs. In the experiments reported here, we
have specifically investigated the following questions. (1) Can
NIR imagery be useful in detecting 2D PAs? (2) Is it possible
to detect 3D-mask attacks (of both rigid and flexible varieties)
in NIR images? (3) Can we use thermal (LWIR) images to
detect custom-made flexible-mask PAs?
A. PAD Using NIR Imagery
We start by confirming the intuition that NIR imagery can
simplify the task of detecting 2D PAs such as print- and replay-
attacks. Figure 4 illustrates typical images captured by the
SR300 camera for various kinds of PAs. Fig. 4(a) and (d) show
the appearance of a print-attack in color- and NIR-imagery,
respectively. We note that although the face may be detected
in the color image (Fig. 4(a)), even a simple image-histogram
analysis would be sufficient to determine that no face present in
the corresponding NIR image (Fig. 4(d)). The analysis for the
digital-replay attack shown in Fig. 4(b) and (e) is analogous.
Fig. 4(c) and (f) show the color and NIR images for the
same rigid mask attack. Visual inspection of the mask region
shows that the simulated facial features, such as the painted
eye-brows and moustache, are entirely suppressed in the NIR
image, and the mask region has a texture-less appearance.
Intuition tells us that detecting such surfaces in NIR images
should be reasonably easy. Contrary to initial expectations,
however, detecting such 3D mask PAs in NIR images is not
straightforward. Comparing Fig. 4(f) with Fig. 3(b), we see
that the NIR image presents similar image characteristics for
both bona fide and 3D-mask attack presentations. Indeed, our
preliminary tests with NIR-860nm band images showed that
lower-order statistics (intensity-histograms, histograms of ori-
ented gradients (HOG) and gray-level co-occurence matrices
(GLCM)) of the 3D-mask presentations are quite similar to
those of bona fide presentations. Detection of 3D mask PAs in
NIR images would require more complex processing such as,
modeling of the peri-occular region.
Although counter-intuitive, this result is quite logical. The
NIR wavelength used by the RGB-D cameras has been de-
liberately chosen to be such that the illumination is strongly
reflected by most kinds of surfaces, including human-skin. This
is imperative for the primary purpose of the camera – capturing
depth-information using structured-NIR illumination.
B. PAD Using Thermal Imagery
(a) Bona fide
(b) 3D-mask attack
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(c) Intensity distribution
Fig. 5: Examples of thermal images of (a) bona fide and (b) 3D-
mask attack presentations. (c) Histograms of average-intensity over
the face-region, for mask- and bona fide presentations, computed over
a small dataset of thermal images.
Thermal (LWIR) images are very well suited for detecting
3D-masks PAs with high certainty. Figure 5 shows images from
the Xenics Gobi thermal camera. The mask in Fig. 5(b), being
cooler than the body-temperature of the subject, is clearly
demarcated. Figure 5(c) shows distributions of the average
pixel-intensity of a small region centered on the face. This
plot has been generated based on a small dataset of bona
fide and 3D-mask attack presentations using five subjects and
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(a) Print; Color (b) Print; NIR
(c) iPad; NIR (d) iPad; Color
(e) 3D Mask; Color (f) 3D Mask; NIR
Fig. 4: Various PAs, as seen by the RGB-D (SR300) camera. Three kinds of attacks – print, replay, and 3D-mask – are shown. Left column (a),
(c), (e): the appearance of print, replay, and 3D-mask attack, respectively, in visible color wavelengths. Right column (b), (d), (f): corresponding
images of the respective scenes under NIR illumination.
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six rigid masks. The intensity distribution for the rigid-mask
presentations is plotted in red, and the distribution for the bona
fide presentations is plotted in green. Although this plot is
based on a very small dataset, it indicates that the average
intensity over the face-region is significantly lower when a
rigid-mask is used.
Flexible silicone masks are often hand-finished, and offer
greater color and texture fidelity, and therefore, pose a greater
threat, compared to rigid masks. The images in Fig. 6 allow
us to compare the appearances of bona fide presentations and
flexible custom-made silicone-mask attack presentations, under
visible-light and NIR illuminations. The mask shown here
(Fig. 6(c), (d)), which is the same as the mask shown in
Fig. 1(c), has been custom-designed to match the face of the
subject shown in Fig. 6(a) and (b)5. Although the mask may
be easily apparent to the human observer, FR systems are quite
vulnerable to such mask-attacks.
(a) Bona fide; RGB (b) Bona fide; NIR
(c) Flex. mask; RGB (d) Flexible mask; NIR
Fig. 6: Comparison of bona fide and flexible silicone mask attack
presentations in visible-light and NIR illuminations. Images captured
using the SR300 camera.
Table I shows the face-recognition scores for the vari-
ous attack-attempts on the reference-subject shown in Fig.
6(a)&(c). The pre-trained VGG-Face neural network [12] has
been used for face-recognition in this experiment. Specifically,
the table shows scores for five zero-effort impostor (ZEI)
presentations, one genuine presentation, and one attack pre-
sentation made using a custom-made silicone-mask. Scores are
shown for two image-modalities – color images and NIR im-
ages. The first row (labeled ’RGB’) shows scores of the various
5The mask was manufactured based on 3D facial scans of the subject, using
the Intel RealSense F200 camera, which is the predecessor of the SR300
camera. Additional color photographs were used to ensure high-quality finish
for the visual appearance of the mask.
presentations using color images, where the target identity is
the image in Fig. 6(a). Scores for a similar experiment using
NIR images, with the image in Fig. 6(b) as the target identity,
are shown in the last row of the table. In both experiments
we can see that the score for the genuine presentation is
at least an order of magnitude higher than the scores for
the ZEI presentations (Subjects 1-5). It is interesting to note
that, in both illumination wavelength bands, the score for the
custom-mask attack is much closer to that of the genuine
presentation, than to the ZEI presentations. This small-scale
experiment cannot be attributed any statistical significance.
It does, however, emphasize the necessity for a large-scale
study involving attacks with high-quality custom-made silicone
masks.
C. Discussion
Preliminary experimental results discussed above show that
extended-range imaging devices can drastically simplify the
task of face-PAD. The task of face-PAD using such devices,
however, in not entirely straightforward. For example, the
main reason why the face in the print-attack is not visible
in 4(d)) is that the ink used here is not IR-reflective6. There
are, however, IR-reflective inks available on the market, that
will show a strong response in NIR-band images [4]. Further
experimentation is therefore necessary to tackle the challenge
print-attacks constructed using IR-reflective inks.
In Fig. 5 we have seen how rigid 3D-mask attacks can
be easily detected using thermal cameras, because the masks
have a much lower temperature than average human body
temperature. This advantage is lost to some extent, when
dealing with flexible silicone masks, which can warm up
very quickly when in contact with warmer objects, such as
an attacker’s face. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the
temperature of a silicone mask when worn by a human subject.
The figure shows six frames of a time-lapse sequence (captured
using the Xenics Gobi camera), with an interval of 30 seconds
between frames. From left to right, the change in temperature
of the mask is evident, especially in the forehead region, where
the mask makes good contact with the subject’s face. The top
of the mask can be clearly distinguished in the first frame on
the left. In the right-most frame, this region seems to be almost
as warm as the subject.
There is a clear need for research into PAD of flexible
3D masks, where the limits of thermal imagery for detecting
custom-made masks is explored under various conditions,
using a large set of silicone masks. Thermal cameras such as
the Xenics Gobi used in this work are still quite expensive.
However, low-cost options are now becoming increasingly
available. Cameras such as the FLIR-One and the Seek-
Thermal Compact Pro are designed to work with mobile
phones, offer adequate spatial resolution, and are available at
relatively modest prices.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Due to the affordability of modern RGB-D cameras, re-
searchers are beginning to look into such cameras for face-
recognition applications. These cameras typically use NIR il-
lumination to recover depth information from the scene. Some
6Note that the specific print-attack used in this example has been printed
according to the specifications prescribed in the Norwegian project SWAN.
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Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Genuine Mask-attack
RGB -0.344 -0.253 -0.265 -0.293 -0.263 -0.038 -0.163
NIR -0.330 -0.227 -0.280 -0.216 -0.198 -0.028 -0.096
Tab. I: Face recognition scores using VGG network.
Fig. 7: Silicone masks can warm up very quickly when worn.
RGB-D cameras also return 2D videos in visible-light and NIR
wavelengths. In this paper we have presented a preliminary
study into the utility of NIR and LWIR imagery for face-
PAD. Our tests with Intel’s RealSense SR-300 camera show
that images in NIR wavelength-band can be used to easily
detect various 2D presentation-attacks, such replay-attacks and
certain kinds of print-attacks. Some kinds of printer-ink do
show a strong response under NIR illumination at certain
wavelengths. In future work we will investigate methods for
detecting print-attacks created using such inks. Contrary to
initial expectations, however, monochromatic NIR imagery, of
the kind provided by low-cost RGB-D cameras, may not be
effective for straightforward detection of 3D-mask attacks.
Realistic custom-made silicone masks will soon be avail-
able at affordable prices. Tt is, therefore, imperative to develop
face-PAD methods that are robust to 3D-mask based attacks.
The examples presented here indicate that the use of NIR
and LWIR imagery for detecting rigid as well as flexible 3D
masks seem to be promising research directions. We would
like to invite the entire biometrics research community to pool
resources to create and share a large and diverse data-set for
the purposes of such research.
Thermal cameras have been available for several decades.
Until recently, however, they have been very expensive, and
have not been considered for PAD applications for reasons
of cost. Low-cost thermal cameras, such as the FLIR-One7
and the Seek-Thermal Compact Pro8, have recently appeared
on the market. These devices are designed to work with
mobile phones. They offer adequate spatial resolution, and are
available at reasonable prices. In future experiments we plan
to explore the applicability of such cameras for PAD.
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